Farmer's game: A game theoretic approach towards burning of crop residue

Crop residue burning in the Indian subcontinent poses a significant environmental and public health threat. We present the 'Farmer's Game, ' a novel game-theoretic model capturing the strategic choices farmers face regarding residue management. The model incorporates individual profit motives, social pressure dynamics, and government intervention through reward and punishment schemes. Analyzing the model reveals that while social pressure can encourage cooperation, it may not be sufficient to achieve substantial pollution reduction. A consequence of the model is that strategically designed government policies offering moderate rewards for non-burning and modest penalties for burning can effectively incentivize environmentally friendly practices. Recognizing the model's limitations and the need for further research, we emphasize its potential to illuminate the complex interplay between individual motivations, social dynamics, and policy options. By understanding these interconnected drivers, we can design more effective interventions to promote sustainable agricultural practices and mitigate air pollution in the Indian subcontinent.