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In bimatrix games with symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs, our work defines an (α, β)-risk aversion Nash equilibrium ((α, β)-RANE) and presents its sufficient and necessary condition. Our work also discusses the relationships between the (α, β)-RANE and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in a bimatrix game with a risk-averse player 2 and certain payoffs. Finally, considering 2 × 2 bimatrix games with STFPs, we find the conditions where the increase in player 2’s risk-aversion level hurts or benefits himself/herself.
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Xu et al. (2024) studied this question.
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