In many Sub-Saharan countries, farmers cannot meet the growing urban demand for higher quality products. While the literature has focused on production-side constraints to enhance smallholder farmers' output quality, there is scarce evidence of market-side constraints. Using a sample of 60 wheat markets in Ethiopia, I assess whether farmers received a price premium for supplying higher quality outputs. I exploit a unique feature of the data which precisely measures observable and less or unobservable quality attributes, and relate them to transaction prices. Observable attributes cannot serve as proxies for less observable ones. Transaction prices further reflect this, indicating that markets only reward quality attributes that are observable at no cost. However, these results hide cross-market heterogeneity. Farmers engage in relational contracts receive a higher price but similar rewards for quality. Observable quality attributes are better rewarded in markets with more traders per farmer, while unobservable attributes are rewarded in the presence of other value chain actors (i.e., grain millers and farmer cooperatives). Both regression and machine learning approaches support these findings.
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Jérémy Do Nascimento Miguel (2024) studied this question.
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