No Self, No Responsibility?

Buddhism holds a seeming contradiction. On the one hand, all humans are not-self (anattā). On the other, humans are said to be responsible for their actions (kamma), which seems to evoke a self who can be responsible. This apparent contradiction brings up the question of who is morally responsible if there is no self? I argue that as the Buddhist subscribes to the not-self position, they are by default moral responsibility skeptics. At first blush this appears to be a problem for responsibility in terms of kamma. But this problem is solved once impersonal interdependent causality (paṭiccasamuppāda) is taken into account, where action and responsibility can still be attributed to humans without needing a self. What the Buddhist has is causal, not moral, responsibility. This shows there is no internal tension in the Buddhist position with not-self and kamma when we consider human action and responsibility because of impersonal interdependent causality, but, there is an external tension between the Buddhist position and contemporary philosophical conceptualizations of moral selves and responsibility.