In this paper, I examine the theory of Radical Flank Effects (RFEs) reflecting on the case of al-Nusra Front and specifically its oscillation between 'moderation' and 'radicalism' in the period between its official establishment in early 2012 and the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017. The main contribution in this paper originates from revisiting Haines' premise that RFEs happen 'unintendedly'. Reflecting on the discourse and behaviour of al-Nusra, I propose that RFEs can be managed purposefully by collective actors in ways that serve their strategic goals. In this sense, claims to moderation may serve as a strategic tool in the hands of collective actors, including militant Islamist organizations. In this regard, the research reveals that al-Nusra's oscillation between moderation and radicalism was by and large purposeful, or at least carefully managed by the organization's ideologues and strategists.
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Azzam Al Kassir (2024) studied this question.
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