This paper constructs a two-level electricity supply chain consisting of the generator and retailer based on the green certificate mechanism (GCM) and considers three different power structure models, including the Vertical Nash game model (model A), the Generator Stackelberg game model (model B), and the Retailer Stackelberg game model (model C), to investigate the renewable energy investment decision problem in the electricity generator under GCM. By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions under three different power structures, the renewable energy investment is lowest in model B. When the renewable energy preference coefficient is small, the renewable energy investment is maximum in model A. When the renewable energy preference coefficient is large, the renewable energy investment is maximum in model C. When the renewable energy preference coefficient is small, the leader's profit is the largest, and the follower's profit is the smallest. Furthermore, the increase in the renewable energy preference coefficient will lead to an increase in the renewable energy investments, electricity prices, and retailer profits, while the increase in the renewable energy cost coefficient will be the opposite. Therefore, the government should encourage electricity enterprises to research and develop technologies related to renewable energy.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jingwen Liao (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: