Adversarial Attacks on Multimodal Agents

Vision-enabled language models (VLMs) are now used to build autonomous multimodal agents capable of taking actions in real environments. In this paper, we show that multimodal agents raise new safety risks, even though attacking agents is more challenging than prior attacks due to limited access to and knowledge about the environment. Our attacks use adversarial text strings to guide gradient-based perturbation over one trigger image in the environment: (1) our captioner attack attacks white-box captioners if they are used to process images into captions as additional inputs to the VLM; (2) our CLIP attack attacks a set of CLIP models jointly, which can transfer to proprietary VLMs. To evaluate the attacks, we curated VisualWebArena-Adv, a set of adversarial tasks based on VisualWebArena, an environment for web-based multimodal agent tasks. Within an L-infinity norm of 16/256 on a single image, the captioner attack can make a captioner-augmented GPT-4V agent execute the adversarial goals with a 75% success rate. When we remove the captioner or use GPT-4V to generate its own captions, the CLIP attack can achieve success rates of 21% and 43%, respectively. Experiments on agents based on other VLMs, such as Gemini-1. 5, Claude-3, and GPT-4o, show interesting differences in their robustness. Further analysis reveals several key factors contributing to the attack's success, and we also discuss the implications for defenses as well. Project page: https: //chenwu. io/attack-agent Code and data: https: //github. com/ChenWu98/agent-attack