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China's western borderlands, heavily non-Han in population, were still weakly territorialized in the Republican period. In 1950, the arrival of the People's Liberation Army in northern Sichuan – then a largely Tibetan space locally managed by rgyal (kings) and lamas – began a multi-decade confrontation with Tibetan indigeneity. The purpose of this article is to determine why the Party government, despite generous financial inputs, has had more difficulty integrating and transforming this ethnic group than almost all the other 54 minorities (minzu). Four widely differing efforts can be distinguished at four conjunctures in the People's Republic: 1) the establishment of the new "autonomous" prefecture of Aba in the "United Front" of the 1950s; 2) violent Maoist social revolution between 1958 and 1968; 3) a Chinese tourist boom beginning in the 1980s; and 4) policies of ethnocultural assimilation since 2013. The first and third modes of territorialization could be described as administrative and neoliberal, and both accommodated Tibetan indigenous elements in what may be called non-state territorialization. The second and fourth have in different ways been authoritarian and assimilative, with the state aiming to make Tibetans, with other non-Han minzu across China, thoroughly Chinese in culture and identification. Despite successes in objective territoriality – in making Aba a state space – the party-state cannot easily superimpose a Chinese identity on Aba and other Tibetans. Some of its actions – the early naming of a "Tibetan" minzu and sharp policy swings in religion and education -have tended to strengthen, not undermine, distinct Tibetan identification.
Donald S. Sutton (Thu,) studied this question.