Board of directors effect on environmental, social and governance performance in publicly traded non-financial firms

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of the board of directors (BoD) structure on environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance in publicly traded non-financial firms from the perspective of agency theory, with investors as the principal, the management team as the agent, the BoD as an information system that reduces information asymmetries between them and ESG performance as a shareholder’s expectation. Design/methodology/approach Sample data is cross-sectional as of January 2023 and includes 1,695 non-financial firms listed in 59 stock markets across 54 countries. Data were sourced from the FactSet Research Systems database. The generalized least squares method was used to run quadratic and exponential models to assess the research hypotheses. Findings Results revealed that board size, independence, age, gender diversity and participation on other corporate boards have a nonlinear relationship with ESG performance. Board tenure is the only BoD attribute for which a nonlinear association is not found. This study found that firms with larger boards and more female board members tend to exhibit a stronger commitment to ESG performance. In contrast, companies with a board of directors consisting of independent members, advanced age, service on other corporate boards and CEO duality may struggle to prioritize positive ESG outcomes. Originality/value This study contributes to the academic discussion on BoD–ESG by examining nonlinear relationships among a large sample of publicly traded firms; providing results that could be applied internationally; using ESG data that is based on the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board's materiality framework, which identifies key ESG factors for investors; emphasizing the significance of diversity and inclusion within the decision-making bodies of public companies, thereby improving their ESG performance; and supporting the agency theory perspective and suggesting that the effect of board structure on ESG may reflect the board's focus on investors’ best interests.