Integrating heterogeneous components in multi-chiplet packaging, known as system-in-package (SiP), is a significant step forward in overcoming limitations by Moore's Law and Dennard scaling. This innovative approach offers enhanced efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and accelerated time-to-market. However, with its globalized supply chain, SiP technology introduces security vulnerabilities distinct from those in system-on-chip (SoC) designs. These risks include potential data leaks, the insertion of malicious circuits within the active interposer, and the possibility of extracting security assets through probing attacks. Current defenses used for traditional SoCs are not adequately designed for this multi-chiplet integration. Moreover, these solutions are vulnerable to quantum attacks due to their reliance on classical methods. In this paper, we introduce PQC-HI, a novel post-quantum-enabled chiplet authentication and key encapsulation framework to safeguard SiP security assets against the supply chain and in-field vulnerabilities. PQC-HI relies on two critical components that need to be integrated into the SiP architecture: the chiplet hardware security module (CHSM) and chiplet security intellectual property (CSIP). Our approach is based on NIST standards CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, providing a protocol resilient to quantum attacks and ensuring secure SiP communication. We implemented this protocol on an FPGA platform and demonstrated the efficiency and area overhead.
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Sami et al. (2024) studied this question.
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