Electronic voting consistently fails to supplant conventional paper ballot due to a plethora of security shortcomings. Not only are traditional voting methods mediocre in terms of transparency, audit, and costs, but they also encompass a principal-agent problem, where acting governments have real capability for tampering. Here, I propose Proof of Work by user devices to fortify integrity of votes as cast and seed-isolated time-based one-time passwords to force observable polling stations. Coupled with end-2-end verifiability, the measures proposed are intended to completely decentralize the voting process. A state would only issue single-use authorizations to vote, while an untrusted publisher would collect and publish two unrelatable lists: votes and voters. Eventually, anyone could tabulate results. Content distribution networks are shown to be instrumental security providers. Weaknesses of proposed architecture are discussed.
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Vitaly Zuevsky (2024) studied this question.
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