VDH: a dynamic honeynet technology based on game theory

As the complexity of cyber attacks increases, honeypot networks, acting as a proactive security mechanism, have become an important area of research in the field of cybersecurity. Although traditional honeynets offer a degree of defense, their limitations in dealing with complex and persistent cyber attacks, including a lack of flexibility, insufficient allure for attackers, and high maintenance costs, are increasingly exposed. This paper introduces a versatile dynamic honeynet architecture (VDH) to compensate for these deficiencies in existing honeynet technologies. By deploying in parallel with enterprise networks and dynamically generating honeypot nodes, the VDH architecture achieves flexible control and redirection of suspicious traffic, thus enhancing network protection capabilities. The paper further abstracts honeynet attack and defense behaviors into a non-cooperative incomplete information game model, and through precise modeling and analysis of the single-stage attack-defense game process, proposes a novel optimal configuration strategy for dynamic honeynets. Lastly, the paper designs and implements the VDH prototype system based on network function virtualization, and verifies the effectiveness and superiority of the VDH structure and configuration strategy.