Агрегиране на убеждения и търсене на консенсус: логика на разногласието

The paper discusses the history of the development of different logical formalisms, explicitly modelling situations in which disagreement is present. It is structured as follows: (§1) sketches the distinction between two main traditions in logic, that have different relation to disagreement; (§2) presents Jaskowski’s discussive logic and its shortcomings; (§3) develops the doctrinal paradox in social choice theory. Then we come to (§4) the probabilistic model of Lehrer-Wagner; (§5) the bounded confidence model of Hegselmann and Krause and (§6) the agent-based model of Douven and Riegler. The aim of the paper is to show that the development of these formalisms raises many questions that are yet not solved in adequate manner.