The global migration landscape is undergoing change. Migration diplomacy—interstate bargaining over migration—is growing in importance, and traditionally (im)migrant-sending countries increasingly serve as transit and recipient countries. Exploring the implications of these trends for public opinion toward immigration, we develop a theory of bilateral reciprocity that links the logic of reward and punishment to citizens’ attitudes toward immigration. Leveraging a survey experiment fielded in the crucial case of Kosovo, we find that respondents prefer immigrants from countries that have helped Kosovo internationally over immigrants from countries that have harmed Kosovo internationally. Nevertheless, respondent preferences for reciprocity are unequal: respondents are more willing to punish than they are to reward immigrants for their sending country’s behavior. Supplemental findings from survey data in Germany lend additional support to our theoretical framework. These findings hold important implications for our understanding of the drivers of attitudes toward immigration and the mass politics of migration diplomacy.
Mailhot et al. (Tue,) studied this question.