Faced with an ever more contested security environment, Japan is shifting towards a forward-leaning denial strategy whereby it seeks 'primary responsibility' for disrupting and defeating invasions 'much earlier and at a further distance' by 2032. In pursuing greater operational and war-fighting readiness, Japan is investing not only in capable air and missile defences, counter-strike missiles, and adequate air and land platforms, but also in appropriate strategic enablers and a broader defence-industrial and technological base. While Japan's ten-year defence plan looks promising, the country's traditional weaknesses and long-standing dependencies will not be easily overcome. In particular, the complexity of East Asia's precision-strike context will sustain, if not deepen, Japan's reliance on the United States for its C4ISR infrastructure and other strategic enablers, as well as for its defence-industrial and technological base. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, an increasingly capable Japan is also increasingly bound to its US ally.
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Lotje Boswinkel (2024) studied this question.
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