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Based on the theory of dual ownership structure and the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, this article finds through investigation that under the background of dual ownership structure in China, there is a serious conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders, and the problem of controlling shareholders abusing their control rights further puts small and medium-sized shareholders in a disadvantaged position. There are deficiencies in the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, such as an incomplete system for protecting the rights and interests of preferred shareholders and a lack of fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders. The fundamental reason for this series of problems is that the institutional design did not fully consider the balance of interests, making it difficult to achieve a balance between efficiency value and safety value. Therefore, the modification and improvement of the framework for protecting the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders under the dual ownership structure should be considered from three aspects: strengthening the protection of the rights and interests of preferred shareholders, internal and external supervision and governance related to voting rights, and the responsibility of controlling shareholders for violating their fiduciary obligations.Suggestions for improving the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders under the dual ownership structure should be proposed.
Jiayi Guo (Wed,) studied this question.