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This article examines certain counterintelligence (CI) aspects of the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 in terms of key conceptual problems in current western CI concepts, doctrine and processes.It examines not only the CI threat to Ukraine during the Donbas 'frozen war' and 2022 invasion from the traditional CI triad of espionage, sabotage and subversion but also from Russian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and activities supporting both irregular and regular combatants.The article concludes that a UK and allied approach to CI shaped by a two-decade security focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency may not be for purpose in a contemporary strategic environment characterized by a persistent and escalating threat from strategic peers and state-supported hybrid conflict.
Philip H. J. Davies (Mon,) studied this question.