Remote electronic voting: application experience in Russia and abroad

The purpose of the article is to study the use of remote electronic voting (DEG) in Russia and a number of foreign countries that have been using this innovative technology for a long period of time during local and national elections (Estonia and Switzerland), as well as those who refused to use it (Germany) due to various political risks. The cases of four countries (Russia, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia) are considered. The study is conducted using the case study method, which allowed us to identify the positive and negative sides of online voting, identify and propose ways to prevent both obvious and potential political risks associated with the widespread use of DEG in practice. Comparative studies are among the auxiliary tools for comprehensive coverage and analysis of the issues under consideration, which made it possible to compare the forms of DEG, their organizational and legal support in Russian and foreign legislation. The theoretical significance of the study is determined by the results of a comprehensive analysis obtained during an excursion into the history of the testing of DEG and the forecast of its further use both in Russia and abroad, structuring the stages of application during elections of various scales, making this method of expressing the will of voters legally binding, or limiting or prohibiting its use both domestically and abroad. for compatriots living abroad. The practical significance of the work consists in offering effective ways of public control over the course of the DEG, which will contribute to increasing confidence in the results of online voting. The authors propose the gradual introduction of DEG and only in regions capable of providing high-quality technical equipment and the possibility of public control over both voting and vote counting. The voter should have the opportunity to vote using a paper ballot in case he changes his mind and decides to express his will in the traditional way, even on the day of voting. Using the example of the cases of four states in which this technology was used with varying degrees of intensity, the authors conclude that it is necessary to use an inclusive (i.e. open) the DEG model and its various modifications (for example, such as the electoral blockchain), so that potential mobile voters have no doubts about the transparency of this method of expressing their will and the ability to track the cast vote at any stage of the electoral process, which will contribute not only to legitimizing the results obtained, but also to increasing confidence in the electoral system as a whole.