Research on Corporate Social Responsibility Investment Considering "Greenwashing" Behavior

With the introduction of the dual-carbon target and the increasing public attention to green products, companies in the supply chain tend to invest in corporate social responsibility. In order to deal with the "greenwashing" behavior of upstream suppliers who use CSR inputs to cover up their defaults, downstream manufacturers are motivated to make CSR audit inputs. To address the above issues, a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer is constructed, and the optimal decisions of both parties in the Stackelberg game model are analyzed under two scenarios, i.e., when the manufacturer invests in CSR auditing and when no CSR auditing is carried out. The study shows that in the case where the supplier is the leader, the manufacturer will invest more in CSR audits when the supplier is "greenwashing" and the government fines are greater than the profits generated by the current market demand.