Problems with NICE's severity weights

This essay examines the implications, plausibility, and justification of the severity weighting that NICE (The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) has endorsed for technology assessments in the U.K. It argues that the assignment by NICE of additional weights to health conditions which involve a large absolute or proportional shortfall of future expected QALYs (Quality-Adjusted Life Years) as compared to those who do not have these health conditions is not well supported and has troubling implications. The literature concerned with attitudes toward prioritizing severity has found a variety of notions of severity, and it is questionable to what extent those studies bear on whether to assign greater weights to health states involving large absolute or proportional shortfalls. In addition, the severity weighting is not well supported by either egalitarian or prioritarian political philosophy, because it is concerned only with the future and focuses only on health rather than well-being in general.