This paper focuses on the evolutionary behaviour and the equilibrium strategy of the digital platform and manufacturing enterprises under the mechanism of reward and punishment.Based on the finite rationality hypothesis, the paper constructs the strategy evolution game model of government, digital platform, and manufacturing enterprise and studies the factors that affect the decision-making of the main body.The results show that:(1) Reasonable control of the amount of government subsidies to digital platforms and the amount of punishment to manufacturing enterprises is the premise of digital platforms and manufacturing enterprises to achieve the best strategy (enabling, innovation).( 2) The number of products sold, the influence coefficient of manufacturing enterprises' innovation on business growth, the excess returns obtained by manufacturing enterprises and the innovation risk coefficient are important factors affecting the strategies of each main body; When the business scale of the enterprise is small or the innovation risk coefficient is low, the probability of the government choosing subsidies will be reduced, and the three parties may fall into the path of (punishment, empowerment, innovation).( 3) The establishment of reward and punishment mechanisms can promote the win-win development of manufacturing enterprises and digital platforms.This study can provide a beneficial decision basis for the development of manufacturing enterprises.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Xu et al. (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: