In recent years, China’s elderly population continues to grow. Population aging is becoming more and more serious, and the corresponding pension configuration problem has not been improved. This situation has left the country with a huge demand for elderly services. The traditional model of elderly care services has been difficult to meet the current situation in China, so it is urgent to explore the smart elderly care service problem. Therefore, this paper starts from the evolutionary game theory, takes the pension institutions and the elderly as the game players, and constructs a two-party evolutionary game model. The system dynamics theory is provided to analyze the stability of the model and derive the optimal strategy selection of players. The results of this study show that regardless of the participation or non-participation of the elderly, care institutions will choose a positive improvement strategy to enhance the quality of elderly care services. This study provides a certain theoretical basis for the intelligent development and improvement of China’s pension problems.
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Deng et al. (2024) studied this question.
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