Analysis of highway maintenance decision-making based on complete information dynamic game theory

In recent years, China's highway network has developed rapidly, and the demand for highway infrastructure maintenance has increased rapidly. Most of the existing research on highway maintenance focuses on optimizing the maintenance strategies under the cost constraint from the perspective of the highway agency, but ignores that the actual highway maintenance activities exist complex conflicts of interest. In the highway maintenance industry, the conflicts of interest between the highway agency and the maintenance service providers are inevitable, but a game equilibrium strategy can reduce the conflicts of interest between them. This paper starts from the dynamic game perspective of the highway agency and the maintenance service providers to establish game-based model, where the highway agency is deemed to be the leader determining the maintenance mileage and the maintenance service provider is deemed to be the follower providing appropriate maintenance services. The dynamic game-based model aiming at finding the optimal mileage is proposed to handle the conflicts between highway agency and maintenance service provider. To solve the model, the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium for this dynamic game problem is calculated to find the maximum maintenance mileage for the highway agency. A 128km highway maintenance project in Zhejiang Province is used to verify the game-based model, and the game analysis result of the maximum maintenance mileage interval is (41.71km, 45.68km).