Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Near‐Miss Reporting Management Based on PT‐MA Theory: Insights From Coal Mines

Effective near‐miss reporting is important for achieving high reliability in safety management. To enhance the effectiveness of near‐miss reporting, this paper examines the dynamic evolution of stakeholders' decision‐making behaviors using coal mines as a case study. A tripartite evolutionary game model is developed, involving enterprises, management, and employees, based on prospect theory and mental accounting theory (PT‐MA theory). Stability analysis and simulations under varying parameters yield the following insights: (i) A higher initial probability of active decision‐making promotes positive strategy evolution, with sensitivity ranked as enterprise management employee. (ii) Near‐miss reporting is mainly driven by cost considerations, with stakeholders' sensitivity to cost changes ranked as employee management enterprise. Lowering the perceived cost of active strategies and raising that of passive strategies encourages active decisions. (iii) A combined reward–punishment strategy is more effective than either alone in motivating employees and management. (iv) The psychological stress experienced by management when the enterprise adopts passive strategies is greater than that employees feel in response to management's passive strategies. Reducing such stress facilitates active strategy evolution. (v) Modifying reference points for perceived benefits and costs, reducing risk preference, and increasing sensitivity to loss aversion can facilitate active strategy evolution. This research offers practical implications for improving near‐miss reporting management in the coal mine industry, including optimizing incentive mechanisms, implementing role‐specific psychological interventions, and adjusting cost–benefit perceptions. These insights may also be applicable to other high‐risk industries facing similar challenges, contributing to more effective and sustainable safety management practices.