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October 13, 2025Open Access

Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining

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Authors

HPHarry Pei

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Overview

Theoretical analysis shows equilibria achieve efficient surplus distribution in bargaining, emphasizing commitment costs.

Key Points

  • Players achieve optimal surplus distribution when both adopt a status quo approach, avoiding conflict.
  • The study reveals that small commitment costs lead to efficient symmetric Markov Perfect equilibria.
  • Renewed commitment to fair demands occurs in nearly all rounds, enhancing negotiation outcomes.
  • Outcomes highlight the importance of patience in bargaining dynamics, which can prevent surplus destruction.

Cite This Study

Harry Pei (2025) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68ece2abd1bb2827d1297186https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2503.01053
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  5. 5Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues2026