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August 8, 2026GamesOpen Access

Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues

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Authors

ASAlessio Staffini

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Overview

Randomized trial investigates economic geometry in Nash bargaining over diverse issues, suggesting new insights in contract theory.

Key Points

  • This research aims to explore how bargaining over multiple issues influences outcomes in Nash bargaining scenarios.
  • Characterization of agreement using endogenous excursion sets of log-relative valuation field.
  • Analysis incorporates concepts of stationarity and ergodicity to yield deterministic payoff limits.
  • Application of Kac-Rice methods to describe boundary intensity and a perimeter penalty for fragmented contracts.
  • The bargaining model demonstrates deterministic many-issue payoff limits.
  • Local shocks and global cutoff feedback are effectively separated under finite-domain perturbation.
  • Curvature-adjusted bargaining conditions are satisfied at regular boundary points, enhancing contract outcomes.

Cite This Study

Alessio Staffini (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a76db12f12abadc79815eechttps://doi.org/10.3390/g17040041
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Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 2 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

  1. 1Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model1982 · 5,402 citations
  2. 2The Bargaining Problem1950 · 7,932 citations