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Expository article develops a multilinear toolkit to analyze equilibrium and welfare in binary-action games, suggesting useful methodologies for research.
This expository article develops a multilinear toolkit for advanced students and researchers studying finite binary-action games. A payoff table has a unique multi-affine extension to the unit cube, equal to expected payoff under independent Bernoulli mixing. From its coefficients we obtain unilateral deviation gains, an exact one-shot exploitability measure whose common zero set is the Nash-equilibrium set, and companion formulas for welfare and payoff disparity under a fixed cardinal normalization. The treatment includes a complete equilibrium classification of a three-player threshold public-good example, joint-moment and covariance corrections for dependent actions, the four obedience inequalities for correlated equilibrium, and the associated welfare linear program. For repeated games, memory-one strategies induce a four-state Markov chain whose resolvent gives normalized discounted payoffs. This representation yields general conditions for grim trigger and separates initial-history Nash equilibrium from subgame perfection for Tit-for-Tat. The article's contribution is a reusable synthesis linking payoff tables, equilibrium calculations, dependence, and repeated-game incentives.
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Souhail Mssassi (2026) studied this question.
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