On What Is Said

Grice’s theory of conversation has enjoyed tremendous success in both philosophy and linguistics since its debut in the sixties. Being one of the aces up Grice’s sleeve, what is said has not been treated as it deserves. I therefore intend to capture what Grice had in mind when he coined and refined this notion by integrating evidence in the related articles, and then justify it with Grice’s philosophizing and my novel interpretations. The detailed analysis once again proves that Grice was substantially consistent over these years in featuring what is said as the truth-conditional, conventional as well as intention-based content of utterance. Seemingly problematic as what is said is, the notion embodies the heretic spirit of Grice and might not be modified without causing more problems. Moreover, Grice’s dichotomy between what is said and what is implicated cannot and is also not designed to solve the semantics-pragmatics conundrum.