PulseExploreJournal ClubResearchersJournals
Instagram
HomeJournal ClubExplore
Synapse
⌘+K
Synapse
October 16, 2025Open Access

Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments

View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Authors

IGIvan GeffnerCOCaspar OesterheldVCVincent Conitzer

Discussion

Loading...

Member takes

Overview

This analysis reveals how staged-commitment mitigates inefficiencies in Nash equilibria, suggesting enhanced social welfare through controlled side payments.

Key Points

  • Introducing a staged-commitment protocol effectively transforms inefficient equilibria into efficient outcomes.
  • The result shows that even Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria can deteriorate under unbounded commitments, highlighting the risks of free-form agreements.
  • Utilizing small, capped transfers during multiple rounds allows for gradual commitment that enhances overall welfare.
  • The study highlights that every welfare-maximizing outcome strictly improves upon the initial Nash equilibrium under the proposed protocol.

Cite This Study

Geffner et al. (2025) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68f12bfb2107091eab27a3achttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2508.07147
View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

  1. 1Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment2026
  2. 2Adaptive Maximization of Social Welfare2024
  3. 3A Multilinear Toolkit for Binary-Action Games: Equilibrium, Welfare, Dependence, and Repeated Interaction2026
  4. 4Safe Pareto Improvements for Expected Utility Maximizers in Program Games2024
  5. 5Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-Conditional Utility Transfers2024