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This paper investigates how modifications in abstract logic affect inner models, highlighting their set theoretic properties.
If L is an abstract logic (a.k.a. model theoretic logic), we can define the inner model C(L) by replacing first order logic with L in Gödel's definition of the inner model L of constructible sets. Set theoretic properties of such inner models C(L) have been investigated recently and a spectrum of new inner models is emerging between L and HOD. The topic of this paper is the effect on C(L) of a slight modification of L i.e. how sensitive is C(L) on the exact definition of L? The $Δ$-extension Δ(L) of a logic is generally considered a "mild" extension of L. We give examples of logics L for which the inner model C(L) is consistently strictly smaller than the inner model C(Δ(L)), and in one case we show this follows from the existence of 0^.
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Väänänen et al. (2025) studied this question.
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