Electoral crimes remain a persistent challenge in Indonesia’s democratic system. Despite constitutional guarantees under Article 1(2), Article 18(4), and Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945), as well as statutory frameworks such as Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections, Law No. 10 of 2016 on Regional Head Elections, the KUHP, and the ITE Law, weak regulatory provisions, inconsistent sanctions, and ineffective enforcement mechanisms continue to undermine the legitimacy of elections and the democratic process. This study seeks to analyze the weaknesses in Indonesia’s legal framework on electoral crimes and to reconstruct penal provisions and enforcement mechanisms to ensure justice, integrity, and transparency in electoral processes. The research adopts a doctrinal legal approach, examining primary legal sources such as the 1945 Constitution, electoral laws, the KUHP, and Constitutional Court decisions, supplemented by secondary sources including academic analysis and international comparative perspectives. The study finds that Indonesia’s enforcement of electoral criminal law remains fragmented and often influenced by political interests. The study recommends key reforms include: (1) harmonizing electoral crime regulations into a coherent legal framework; (2) strengthening penal sanctions to improve deterrence; (3) establishing a special judicial mechanism dedicated to electoral crimes; (4) improving coordination among law enforcement agencies; and (5) expanding civic and legal education to promote electoral integrity. The Study concluded that, Elections are the foundation of democratic legitimacy in Indonesia, yet their credibility depends on effective enforcement of electoral laws. Current frameworks inadequately prevent or address electoral crimes, risking erosion of public trust and weakening democratic consolidation. Reconstruction of electoral crime regulations, guided by constitutional principles of justice and people’s sovereignty, is thus imperative to ensure that elections serve as a fair, transparent, and democratic mechanism for leadership selection.
Suriadi et al. (Sun,) studied this question.