This analysis shows how balanced contributions and consistency characterize the generalization of the Shapley value for games with externalities, suggesting a framework for fair distribution.
We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev's consistency, and Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency for games with externalities, and we show that these properties lead to characterizations of the generalization of the Shapley value introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339-356), that parallel important characterizations of the Shapley value.
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Casajus et al. (2025) studied this question.
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