Analysis shows Lebanon's political structure affects compliance with EU migration control objectives, highlighting clientelism and NGO roles.
This article examines Lebanon’s informal, often opaque, migration governance in response to the Syrian refugee crisis (2012–2024), shaped significantly by EU external migration policies. Lebanon’s approach relies on elite bargains and back-door agreements, sidestepping formal policy processes within its sectarian, consociational political system. The EU’s influence, grounded in extensive financial aid, aims to contain refugee movements within Lebanon, aligning with its broader migration control objectives. However, Lebanon’s fragmented political structure enables it to selectively implement policies, leveraging its strategic position to secure funding without committing to strict compliance as a part of the country’s informal migration diplomacy. The result is a highly informalized, ad hoc governance model where NGOs play a critical role, but where elite corruption and clientelism continue to hamper effective policy. This dynamic underscores the power asymmetry between the EU and Lebanon, and reveals the limitations of externally driven governance models in contexts marked by political division and elite capture.
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Knudsen et al. (2025) studied this question.
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