The article demonstrates that Chinese tech capital adapts in response to national interests and economic nationalism, highlighting state power in global cyberspace.
This article investigates how China's platform and data infrastructure expand globally amid shifting state-capital relations at home and abroad. Moving beyond the dichotomy of ‘democratic free market capitalism’ and ‘authoritarian state capitalism’, it situates China within a broader shift towards ‘new state capitalism’, where states act increasingly as promoters, regulators and owners of capital. Drawing on multi-sited fieldwork in Shenzhen and Jakarta (2022–2023) and a statistical analysis of Alibaba, Tencent and ByteDance investments (2013–2023), the article argues that internationalisation by Chinese tech capital is best understood as reactive adaptation rather than proactive geopolitical design: domestically, antitrust actions, data securitisation and industrial upgrading pushed private firms outwards; externally, U.S. neo-mercantilist policy and economic nationalism in the Global South – such as in India and Indonesia – reveal strategies of exclusion, redirection and selective absorption that reroute foreign tech capital alongside national agendas. In an era of declining multi-stakeholder governance, the article theorises contemporary global cyberspace as a ‘mosaic of state power’, where sovereigns pursue their developmental agendas and reshape capital flows in line with their national interests. It also advances a relational, ecological account of ‘new state capitalism’ that explains how confrontation and emulation among states drive a new digital order.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Weidi Zheng (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: