The concept of human dignity is frequently invoked in contemporary ethical, legal, and political discourse, yet often remains ungrounded in any coherent ontological framework. This article argues that the contemporary fragility and fragmentation of the idea of dignity stem from a deeper metaphysical crisis: the abandonment of a realist conception of human nature and the rise of nominalism. By contrasting nominalism with Aristotelian-Thomistic realism, it shows that human dignity cannot be coherently sustained without recognizing a stable and objective human essence. Through historical and philosophical analysis, the article traces how modern thought has increasingly severed the link between language and being, replacing the classical understanding of personhood with functional, procedural, or relational definitions. As a result, dignity is frequently tied to contingent attributes such as autonomy, sentience, or cognitive performance—criteria that exclude the most vulnerable members of the human family. The article examines how this metaphysical shift affects bioethical deliberations in areas such as embryonic research, end-of-life care, artificial intelligence, and transhumanism. It argues that without a stable ontological foundation, dignity becomes a rhetorical construct, vulnerable to technocratic reductionism and moral relativism. In response to contemporary objections—including pluralism, autonomy, and historicism—the article defends the ongoing relevance of a realist metaphysics. Far from suppressing freedom or diversity, it provides the necessary framework for dialogue, responsibility, and moral coherence. It concludes that defending human dignity in the postmodern age requires more than legal instruments or ethical consensus: it demands a renewed inquiry into the being of the human person, and the metaphysical foundations that make dignity not only intelligible but inviolable.
Frantz et al. (2025) studied this question.