On the Prehistory of Physicalism

When the term “physicalism” is not used interchangeably with “materialism” it typically names a meta-linguistic or methodological view that is intended to sidestep metaphysical debates like those between materialists, dualists, and idealists. Well-known versions of this anti-metaphysical outlook were defended in the 1930s by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. Indeed, according to a standard account, these thinkers introduced the word “physicalism” into philosophy. In this paper, I explore the pre-history of physicalism as an anti-metaphysical articulation of the unity of science. The terms “physicalism” and “physicalists” were first used in the 1850s, far earlier than is commonly recognized, to refer to a cluster of views developed by phrenologists and early positivists such as Franz Joseph Gall and Henri de Saint-Simon. I argue that this fact has more than mere etymological significance. These nineteenth-century thinkers expressed a distinctive proto-physicalist position that contained two core components of the Vienna Circle’s physicalism—the unity of method and unity of laws. They also contributed to a tradition that influenced the Vienna Circle’s agenda of using the unified conceptual structure of the sciences, which results from physicalism, to enable social progress.