This essay examines how physicalism became an accepted assumption in intellectual discourse, suggesting historical contingencies.
Physicalism—the view that reality is fundamentally physical and that consciousness is derivative or reducible—now functions less as a defended thesis than as the background assumption of serious intellectual discourse. This essay does not argue for or against physicalism's truth. It asks a different question: how did this particular metaphysical framework come to feel like common sense rather than doctrine? The answer is not primarily philosophical. Physicalism's dominance emerged from a convergence of methodological success, political and religious pressures, industrial transformation, institutional incentives, and cultural shifts—until its status as a metaphysical position faded from view. Understanding this history does not refute physicalism, but it does reveal its contingency. What feels inevitable is shown to be historically situated. This clarity is a precondition for responsible inquiry. Part of the Return to Consciousness research program—18 philosophical essays exploring consciousness-first metaphysics. Full project: https://brunoton.github.io/return-to-consciousness/
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Bruno Tonetto (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: