Political corruption and voting in Romanian municipal elections: Why perceptions of collective action matter

In recent years, scholars have investigated the ‘corruption voting puzzle’, ie why, despite an overwhelming distaste for corruption, voters often collectively fail to ‘throw the rascals out’. While previous literature has largely investigated why voters support corrupt incumbents, our focus lies on nonvoters. Using an original two-wave panel data with Romanian voters just prior to and after the 2020 municipal elections, we test three hypotheses. First, that there is a discrepancy between voters’ intentions and their actual voting behavior (e.g. ‘norms versus actions’). Second, that those most pessimistic about other voters’ intentions to come out to the polls to vote out corrupt incumbents are most likely to abstain. Finally, building on the collective action literature, whether providing such pessimistic voters with information about the intentions of other voters will decrease abstention and increase opposition voting. Using original observational and experimental data, we demonstrate empirical support for our three hypotheses.