Social Science and the Naturalization of Social Metaphysics

Some philosophers challenge the advisability of naturalizing social metaphysics by appeal to social science. They argue that social science fails to meet criteria for realist commitment, such as unity and novel predictive power, and that social science would therefore be a poor anchor for naturalization projects. These skeptical challenges are rooted in traditions in the philosophy of science that have held the social sciences in low esteem. Through a case study that highlights the ways in which archaeology is methodologically converging on hard science, I show that the old philosophical bias against social science is outmoded. I suggest that at least some of the methodological advances of archaeology and other social sciences are epistemologically significant and should be taken to bear on the question of realism. However, I conclude with the thought that realist commitment need not be a precondition for naturalization. The paper therefore accomplishes two main things: 1) it removes argumentative roadblocks to the use of social science in the naturalization of social metaphysics, and 2) it motivates a higher estimation of the epistemological credentials of social science as compared with more skeptical traditions.