Whose Economic Pain for What Security Gain? The Strategic and Normative Concerns Surrounding the UN Sanctions on North Korea

This article examines the ambiguous relationship between economic pain and security gain in the context of increasingly comprehensive United Nations sanctions on North Korea. Sanctions are designed as a non-military tool to induce compliance by inflicting economic hardship on a target regime. However, our case study of North Korea raises strategic and normative concerns about the assumption that greater economic pain leads to greater security gains. Using a mixed-methods approach, including policy analysis, expert interviews, and nightlight satellite data, our study highlights ongoing restrictions on international aid and distorted resource allocation, where Pyongyang enjoys disproportionate access to resources at the expense of marginalized regions. Drawing on John Burton’s conflict theory, we discuss how sanctions, as a tactic, can become conflated with the ultimate goal of international security, leading to prolonged domestic humanitarian suffering without clear strategic gains. This article calls for a critical reassessment of UN sanctions on North Korea, advocating for their use as a modifiable tool rather than a self-perpetuating measure. It underscores the importance of distinguishing between punitive economic pain and the original goal of influencing regime behavior, ensuring sanctions remain adaptable, and aligned with their intended security objectives.