From Coercive Distribution to Material Co-optation: Changing Mechanisms of Political Control in North Korea’s Labor Market

In this article, we discuss how the North Korean government has dealt with the emergence of a private labor market within the country. We utilize theories from the comparative study of political control in authoritarian regimes, and examine a novel mechanism of material co-optation by which North Korean workers purchase the right to exit the state sector and work in the private sector. This form of material co-optation has developed since the 1990s, with the state allowing workers to enter the private sector for a fee, on the understanding that they will submit to state surveillance and indoctrination. We utilize a wide array of qualitative sources, including interview testimony, official North Korean sources, and South Korean survey data to develop a composite picture of official and unofficial employment in the country. Further, we show how the regime accepts some level of informality, which helps to enrich some of its workers, while keeping many workers in a position of structural disadvantage of underemployment in the state sector.