Distributed Secondary Resilience Framework for AC Islanded Microgrids Against FDI Attacks

This paper presents a novel distributed secondary resilience control strategy designed to effectively counteract the instability induced by false data injection (FDI) attacks in islanded microgrids. Initially, precise FDI attack models were developed for various attack locations, and their impacts on the stability of islanded microgrids were examined. Subsequently, a secondary frequency controller was proposed, grounded in the distributed consensus algorithm. Utilizing adaptive control principles, a resilient secondary controller was engineered to mitigate the detrimental effects of FDI attacks on the microgrid's operation. The stability of the proposed controller was theoretically established using the Lyapunov function. The effectiveness of the control method was verified through hardware‐in‐the‐loop simulation, providing a practical and efficient solution for maintaining the stable operation of islanded microgrids under complex attack scenarios.