Gamson's Law in the City Hall: The Populist Radical Right and the Dilemma of Allocating Municipal Portfolios in Sweden

Does the proportional distribution of office payoffs between coalition partners, known as ‘Gamson's Law’, hold at the local level? And can the inclusion of a populist radical right (PRR) party in a coalition lead to deviations from this law? This article addresses these two questions by examining municipal coalitions that were formed following the 2022 Swedish elections. I demonstrate that Gamson's Law proves relevant at the municipal level in Sweden but find that the PRR Sweden Democrats (SD) face, on average, a disproportional allocation unmatched by any other party. I find that the inclusion of SD is, by far, the most substantively significant factor driving disproportionality. I suggest that relinquishing office positions corresponds to a specific price that the PRR is willingly paying to facilitate inclusion within municipal coalitions. This article contributes to a growing body of literature examining the relevance of Gamson's Law at the municipal level. Furthermore, it identifies a new pattern of deviation relating to the inclusion of a PRR party, inviting researchers to further explore the PRR's impact on coalition politics.