This analysis reveals flaws in offensive realism's key assumptions, suggesting this theory inadequately models international politics.
The present paper calls into question one of the most prominent International Relations theories: John J. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. By bringing to bear the conceptual apparatus of Austrian- and public-choice-style political economy, the article demonstrates Mearsheimer’s conception to be either substantively unsound or logically fallacious. More specifically, three of the notorious five ‘bedrock assumptions’ of offensive realism – uncertainty regarding other actors’ intentions, the primacy of survival, and the rationality of statesmen – are, depending on interpretation, either untenable or insufficient to support the conclusions Mearsheimer purports to have established. Thus, the article contends that offensive realism is a faulty approach to international politics. This is largely due to the neglect of economic science, which results in the latent assumption of the absoluteness of national survival as a goal of states. It is this assumption that underlies the entire edifice of offensive realism and simultaneously renders it surprisingly utopian and idealistic.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Norbert Slenzok (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 4 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: