Information Misreporting Behavior and Optimal Pricing Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Dominant Power Structures

This study explores the information misreporting behavior among channel members and the optimal pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain under information asymmetry, where the manufacturer operates an online channel, and the retailer operates an offline channel. More specifically, Stackelberg game models are developed for both manufacturer-led and retailer-led scenarios to analyze the impact of different power structures on the pricing decisions, information misreporting behavior, and the profits of both individual members and the overall supply chain. The main findings are as follows: (1) The power structure exerts a pivotal influence on the misinformation strategies adopted by supply chain members. (2) As the retailer’s misinformation factor increases, the wholesale price decreases, whereas the traditional retail price rises. (3) The profit advantage from dominance is counteracted by misreporting, and the extent of this effect depends on cross-price sensitivity. (4) Followers often resort to information misreporting to maximize their own profits, a strategy that benefits the misreporting party individually yet undermines the total supply chain profit.