Governance Structures, Political Change and Executive Turnover in State‐Owned Enterprises: Evidence From Chile

To address the shortcomings associated with state ownership, countries have implemented various legal strategies to curb political influence in state‐owned enterprises. This research studies whether these strategies constrain the government's ability to use their appointment powers for political considerations. Using logit models, I analyze whether the probability of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover increases once a new government comes into power and whether some state‐owned enterprise governance structures (board of directors' independence, ownership models and legal status) can moderate the CEO turnover sensitivity to political change. This study is based on an original dataset of state‐owned enterprises' governance characteristics and turnover events in Chile from 2006 to 2023. I find that, while CEOs are more likely to be replaced following a change in government, the turnover sensitivity to political change is heterogeneous among companies with different governance structures. These findings provide insights into what governance mechanisms are the most effective in preventing political interference.