This survey uncovers hardware security techniques for invasive tampering detection in systems, highlighting electrical characteristics and evaluation methodologies.
Protecting the integrity of hardware against invasive tampering within the supply chain is critical to ensuring overall system resilience, reliability, and trustworthiness. As electronic systems become increasingly complex and globally distributed, the risk of malicious modifications or unauthorized alterations to hardware components continues to grow. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive exploration of detection and mitigation strategies for invasive hardware tampering across multiple levels of the hardware stack. We consider threats at various granularities—from individual on-board integrated circuits (ICs), to Printed Circuit Board Assemblies (PCBAs), and up to complete end-user devices. Our focus centers on three primary categories of invasive tampering: hardware Trojans, counterfeit components, and physical manipulations. A key emphasis of this survey is on hardware security techniques that leverage alterations in electrical characteristics induced by tampering. These include changes in power delivery network (PDN), signal trace, and other low-level electrical pathways. Such variations often serve as sensitive indicators of physical intrusions or modifications and are particularly useful for monitoring hardware integrity throughout its lifecycle—from manufacturing and deployment to maintenance and eventual decommissioning. We examine both golden-reference-based and golden-free detection approaches, highlighting their operational principles, design trade-offs, and applicability in different threat scenarios. Furthermore, we survey evaluation methodologies and metrics used to assess the effectiveness, scalability, and robustness of these techniques. This paper aims to provide a unified and up-to-date overview of detection research framework based on electrical characteristic variation, offering critical insights for researchers and practitioners working to safeguard hardware systems against invasive tampering and supply chain threats.
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Sun et al. (2025) studied this question.
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