This paper demonstrates the need for a philosophy of science integrating metabolic findings in cognitive development, suggesting holistic perspectives on autonomy and symbiosis.
Enactivism has recently faced criticism for either leaning too heavily on philosophical speculation without clear scientific grounding, or relying on quite old empirical work in cognitive science, especially concerning sensorimotor actions. While one can push back against such charges, in this paper we take a different approach. We will use metabolic and microbiome research as a case study to help make this problem vivid, and to outline a path forward. First, we contend that a closer look at metabolism and microbiota-host interactions places pressure upon some of the core ‘autopoietic’ concepts of enactivism, including self-production, autonomy, and operational closure. This research instead appears to emphasise heteronomy and symbiosis in cognitive, developmental, and evolutionary processes, posing in effect an ontological challenge. Second, it also raises some questions about enactivism’s traditional avoidance of reductionist explanations, suggesting that there is an epistemic need for a philosophy of science that clarifies how to integrate more reductive biological programs within holistic enactivist frameworks. To meet these challenges, we argue that enactivism needs to moderate its commitments to autopoietic theory.
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Reynolds et al. (2025) studied this question.
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