This framework enhances privacy and reduces data leakage in federated learning by applying homomorphic encryption and differential privacy.
Federated Learning (FL) and Split Learning (SL) maintain client data privacy during collaborative training by keeping raw data on distributed clients and only sharing model updates (FL) or intermediate results (SL) with the centralized server. However, this level of privacy is insufficient, as both FL and SL remain vulnerable to security risks like poisoning and various inference attacks. To address these flaws, we introduce SplitML, a secure and privacy-preserving framework for Federated Split Learning (FSL). SplitML generalizes and formalizes FSL using IND−CPAD secure Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) combined with Differential Privacy (DP) to actively reduce data leakage and inference attacks. This framework allows clients to use different overall model architectures, collaboratively training only the top (common) layers while keeping their bottom layers private. For training, clients use multi-key CKKS FHE to aggregate weights. For collaborative inference, clients can share gradients encrypted with single-key CKKS FHE to reach a consensus based on Total Labels (TL) or Total Predictions (TP). Empirical results show that SplitML significantly improves protection against Membership Inference (MI) attacks, reduces training time, enhances inference accuracy through consensus, and incurs minimal federation overhead.
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Trivedi et al. (2025) studied this question.
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