ABSTRACT Peer‐to‐peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a promising approach for managing energy produced by prosumers. However, the influence of diverse prosumer behaviours on P2P energy trading remains underexplored. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the various behavioural patterns shown by sellers in the energy trading market. Unlike previous studies that have examined only limited aspects of prosumer behaviour, this paper, in addition to behaviours such as competition and coalition, also examines the likelihood of strategic behaviours arising in sellers' decision‑making processes. To achieve this, game theory, a robust framework for modelling individual and collective behaviours, is employed. In the proposed model, buyers act as price proposers, while sellers serve as energy suppliers. The behaviour of sellers is modelled under different conditions: competition, coalition, and coalition suspension. The analysis reveals that coalition formation among sellers yields higher payoffs compared to competition behaviour. However, it is also demonstrated that coalitions can be suspended (violated) because prosumers can achieve greater gain by suspending their coalitions. Additionally, prosumers employ the grim trigger strategy to prevent the suspension of coalitions. Additionally, in another section of this article, a new bilateral negotiation mechanism is presented, which is designed to be implemented in a distributed manner within the structure of P2P energy trading. This market‐clearing mechanism is designed to consider, in addition to economic constraints, technical and operational constraints and the matching of buyers and sellers. Moreover, the mechanism includes a constraint to prevent the emergence of market power and to address coalition and strategic behaviour by sellers. That constraint is applied so as, on the one hand, not to reduce sellers’ participation and, on the other, to remain effective. To evaluate the proposed approach, the performance of the bilateral negotiation mechanism, the economic aspects of the suggested method, the analysis of prosumer behaviour, the impact of coalition suspension and the effects of purposeful behaviours on P2P trading have been examined.
Izanlo et al. (Thu,) studied this question.